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ALUCHEM, INC. a/k/a The Aluchem Group 
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on January 26, 2017 
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________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
 Petron Scientech, Inc., and Yogendra Sarin had numerous business dealings with 
Ronald P. Zapletal and Aluchem, Inc., over the course of several years.  These dealings 
culminated in a joint venture that ultimately failed.  Both sides then asserted contractual 
claims against each other.  Zapletal and Aluchem also requested an award of attorney 
fees because they believed that Petron and Sarin had made frivolous claims.  After a 
bench trial, the District Court held that no party was entitled to any damages or fees from 
any other party.  Both sides appealed.  We will affirm. 
I. Background 
A. Factual Background 
 In 1991, Sarin founded Petron, a chemical engineering company.  Petron has 
developed a process that improves the environmental sustainability of an aspect of 
plastic-making.  In 2007, hoping to profit from this technology, Zapletal and Sarin signed 
a Letter of Intent that proposed that a new company, to be formed and controlled by 
Zapletal and possibly several others, acquire Petron’s assets.  On July 2, 2007, Zapletal 
paid a $100,000 down payment, which would convert to a loan to Petron if the 
acquisition was not completed by October 14th, 2007.  Formalizing this arrangement, 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Zapletal sent a promissory note to Petron, which Sarin signed.  The acquisition was never 
completed. 
 Subsequently, Sarin and Zapletal became aware of a business opportunity 
involving the construction of a chemical plant for Dow Chemical.  In order to pursue this 
opportunity, on May 11, 2009, Sarin and Zapletal agreed to a joint venture.  Their 
agreement, the “Green Biochemicals contract,” created a new entity called Green 
Biochemicals, LLC.  This entity was owned equally by Petron and Aluchem.  The parties 
agreed that Zapletal, “as CEO of [Green Biochemicals], will arrange loans/grants, equity, 
government funding or private funding of $2.5 million for the first Dow project for 
[Green Biochemicals] as quickly as is possible.”  Then, “[f]rom initial funds arranged, 
[Green Biochemicals] will make a non recourse/non refundable cash payment of $1.0 
million to Petron as upfront technology development and project support fee.  Petron will 
retire a $100,000 Note to . . . Zapletal . . ..”  The parties further agreed that Sarin would 
contribute expertise in the development of these projects, for which he would be paid 
$250,000 annualy, and that Petron would receive certain technology license and 
development fees.  While negotiating this agreement, Zapletal suggested to Sarin that he 
would be able to secure funding easily.   
 However, the Dow Chemical deal was never completed because Green 
Biochemicals was never able to secure a needed loan or grant from the Department of 
Energy.  By December 2009, Sarin and Petron knew that the funding was not 
forthcoming, but the parties continued to seek licensing opportunities for Petron’s plastic-
making process.  In March 2010, Green Biochemicals began negotiating terms of a 
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potential deal with Coca-Cola, which was interested in creating bottles using Petron’s 
green technology.  During the Coca-Cola negotiations, Sarin told Zapletal that Petron’s 
financial situation was improving, and Zapletal requested payment on the promissory 
note, but no payment followed.  By May 2011, the Coca-Cola deal failed because, again, 
Green Biochemicals was unable to secure loan or grant money.   
 In June 2011, after the Coca-Cola negotiations had failed, Zapletal sent Sarin a 
letter requesting payment on the promissory note by August 15, 2011.  Sarin responded 
by letter, asserting that the amount owed under the promissory note was not yet due and 
that, because Petron and Sarin had fulfilled their obligations under the agreements 
creating Green Biochemicals, Zapletal and Green Biochemicals owed Sarin $1 million 
for four years of back pay and Petron $900,000 (that is, $1 million under the agreement 
offset by the $100,000 loan).   
B. Procedural Background 
 On November 18, 2011, Sarin and Petron filed a lawsuit in New Jersey Superior 
Court of Middlesex County against Zapletal and Aluchem.  The plaintiffs alleged breach 
of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference 
with economic benefit, knowing misrepresentation, and conversion.  Sarin sought 
damages equal to the $1 million in salary that he had requested by letter from Zapletal, 
and Petron sought damages equal to the $1 million in technology development and 
project support fees that Sarin had requested in the same letter.  On December 7, 2011, 
the defendants removed the case to federal court.  On November 7, 2012, the defendants 
filed a counterclaim seeking damages of $100,000 for failure to satisfy the note.  In 
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addition, the defendants filed a motion for attorney fees on the ground that the plaintiffs’ 
claims were frivolous. 
 A five day bench trial began on December 3, 2015.  At the end of the final day of 
trial, the District Court read its decision from the bench.  The court concluded that neither 
party was entitled to any remedy. 
II. Discussion1 
 Sarin and Petron have appealed, arguing that Zapletal breached the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing and that the termination clause of the contract was not their 
sole remedy for breach.  Thus, they argue that they should be awarded damages.  Zapletal 
and Aluchem have cross-appealed the denial of their counterclaim, arguing that Petron 
still owes Zapletal under the terms of the promissory note and that their motion for 
attorney fees should have been granted. 
A. Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
 On the good faith and fair dealing claim, the District Court found that Zapletal’s 
description of his ability to secure financing for Green Biochemicals’s deals was mere 
puffery and therefore not actionable. The plaintiffs do not contest that Zapletal’s 
statements were mere puffery.  Instead, the plaintiffs argue that Zapletal, by engaging in 
puffery, breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the Green 
Biochemicals contract,2 which entitles them to damages.  They argue that puffery is 
                                                 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
2 See Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 773 A.2d 1121, 1126 (N.J. 2001) (“A covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing is implied in every contract in New Jersey.” (citing Sons of 
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inherently inconsistent with the duties imposed by the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.3  However, this argument is unpersuasive.  A breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing requires doing something “which will have the effect of destroying 
or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract”4 and requires 
bad motive or intention.5  Puffery is simply “[t]he expression of an exaggerated opinion . 
. . with the intent to sell a good or service,”6 and it is common and ordinary among 
sellers.  It does not harm the rights of the buyer or demonstrate bad intentions on the part 
of the seller. Thus, mere puffery does not violate the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.7 
B. Termination Clause 
 The District Court held that Sarin and Petron’s only remedy for Zapletal’s failure 
to secure funding for the Dow Chemical project was to terminate the agreement.  The 
plaintiffs disagree; they argue that they should have been awarded expectation damages.8 
 Under New Jersey law, the usual remedy for breach of contract is to put the 
nonbreaching party in the same position as that party would have been in had the breach 
                                                                                                                                                             
Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 690 A.2d 575 (N.J. 1997))). 
3 This argument raises an issue of state law, so our review is plenary.  Hofkin v. Provident 
Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 1996). 
4 Wilson, 773 A.2d at 1126-27 (quoting Sons of Thunder, 690 A.2d at 587). 
5 Brunswick, 864 A.2d at 396 (quoting Wilson, 773 A.2d at 1130). 
6 Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
7 The plaintiffs argue that Zapletal was subject to a heightened fiduciary duty as a party to 
a joint venture with Sarin.  At the time he was puffing, however, Zapletal was not yet a 
party to a joint venture with Sarin, so no heightened duties applied to him. 
8 This presents a question of contract interpretation based in part on facts adduced at trial, 
so we review the District Court’s decision for clear error.  See Ram Const. Co. v. Am. 
States Ins. Co., 749 F.2d 1049, 1052-53 (3d Cir. 1984). 
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not occurred.9  “What that position is depends upon what the parties reasonably 
expected.”10  In particular, “the innocent party has a right to damages based on his 
expectation interest as measured by the loss in the value to him caused by the breaching 
party’s nonperformance.”11  However, contracting “parties can by agreement vary the 
rules” applicable to breach of contract, such as by “provid[ing] for a remedy such as 
repair or replacement in substitution for damages.”12  The contract here did so provide: 
If [Green Biochemicals] is unable to complete a funding for the first project 
or is unable to provide Petron $1 million for upfront technology 
development and project support fee within 18 months from signing date, 
Petron will be free to cancel this contract and will have right to proceed 
with development of this business/similar projects with third parties. 
 
Based on the contractual language and trial testimony, the District Court determined that 
this provision specifies what would happen if Green Biochemicals failed to secure 
funding and pay Petron $1 million.  Moreover, to the extent that Sarin also challenges the 
determination that he was not entitled to any salary, the contract provides, “[Sarin’s 
s]alary will begin when first project funding is arranged.”  Because funding was never 
arranged, Sarin was never entitled to salary.  Because the parties in fact did as provided in 
the contract, there is no further remedy available. 
                                                 
9 Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 860 A.2d 435, 442 (N.J. 2004). 
10 Donovan v. Bachstadt, 453 A.2d 160, 165 (N.J. 1982). 
11 Furst, 860 A.2d at 442 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 347(a)) (internal 
quotation marks and ellipses omitted). 
12 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 346 cmt. a.  New Jersey has not expressly 
adopted this section of the Restatement, but it regularly relies on much of the rest of the 
Restatement with respect to damages.  See, e.g., Furst, 860 A.2d at 442; Donovan v. 
Bachstadt, 453 A.2d at 166 (§ 351).  Thus, we expect that the New Jersey Supreme Court 
would apply this portion of the Restatement as well.  See In re Makowka, 754 F.3d 143, 
148 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that when a state supreme court has not ruled on the precise 
issue presented, we predict how that tribunal would rule). 
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C. The Promissory Note 
 The District Court reasoned that the promissory note was “subsumed” into the 
Green Biochemicals contract, so termination of the Green Biochemicals contract also 
terminated Petron’s obligation to repay the note.  Thus, the District Court concluded that 
“there’s no obligation of Mr. Sarin, under any theory I can think of, to repay [the] 
promissory note at this time.”  The defendants cross-appeal, claiming that this conclusion 
was clearly erroneous. 
 “Clear error exists when, giving all deference to the opportunity of the trial judge 
to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and to weigh the evidence, we are left with a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”13  Under New Jersey 
law, contracts are to be interpreted according to “the intention of the parties to the 
contract as revealed by the language used,”14 so we consider the text of the contracts 
together with extrinsic evidence adduced at trial.15  Here, after review of the full record, 
including the trial transcript and after consideration of the intent of the parties as 
manifested in the documents and in their testimony, we find no clear error in the District 
Court’s determination that the promissory note was subsumed into the contract so that 
                                                 
13 McNeil Nutritionals, LLC v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 511 F.3d 350, 360 (3d Cir. 
2007) (quoting A & H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 191, 
194 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
14 Conway v. 287 Corp. Ctr. Assocs., 901 A.2d 341, 347 (N.J. 2006) (quoting Atl. N. 
Airlines v. Schwimmer, 96 A.2d 652, 656 (N.J. 1953)). 
15 See Mylan Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 723 F.3d 413, 419 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(observing that, under New Jersey law, extrinsic evidence is always admissible to aid in 
interpreting contracts). 
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termination of the contract also terminated the obligation to repay.  Therefore, we will 
affirm the judgment of the District Court on this issue.     
D. Attorney Fees 
 Defendants also claim that the District Court should have granted their motion for 
attorney fees.  They argue that plaintiffs’ claims were frivolous or insubstantial and that it 
was an abuse of discretion not to award attorney fees.16  However, we do not believe that 
any of the arguments made in this case was sufficiently frivolous or insubstantial that 
denying an award of attorney fees was an abuse of discretion. 
III. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
                                                 
16 Federal law and the laws of the states which govern the Green Biochemicals contract 
(New Jersey) and the promissory note (Colorado) permit an award of attorney fees when 
a party makes frivolous arguments.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:15-
59.1(a)(1); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-17-102(2).  We review for abuse of discretion.  
Moeck v. Pleasant Valley Sch. Dist., 844 F.3d 387, 389-90 (3d Cir. 2016). 
